The Narcotics and Terror Nexus between IRGC and Latin America II
This is part 2 of a multi-part series
This is the 2nd part of a multi-part series on the IRGCโs operations, both within Iran and abroad. The first 2 parts give a background of the IRGCโs structure, while the remaining parts will delve into the details of the IRGCโs relationship with proxy organizations and foreign countries, including training and operational activities with those foreign countries.
While many would believe the economic sanctions against Iran have created some discernable difference in the behavior of the regime, that would be categorically incorrect. The economic conditions, created by the sanctions, have caused a situation that is untenable for average Iranian, causing some Iran experts to compare dissatisfaction in the current Iran to those of Iran in 1978; this has, however, not changed the operations of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and more specifically the Quds Force, the IRGCโs terror arm.
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Why has the IRGC-QF not changed their activities?
The IRGC-QF has purposely kept a low profile in their operations, on the orders of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who has reportedly told the leadership โ tone it down, lower the temperature, and donโt give any pretext for anything that could be considered an American red line leading to an open military conflict. The Supreme Leaderโs positions were encouraged by a decrease in revenue generation, meaning there are no funds to engage a better funded adversary, nor any other military.
The following encompass the shift in IRGC-QF activities:
Political Change: with the change in political leadership in the US and the election of Donald Trump as President, the IRGC-QF has become more covert in their operations. Understanding that Trump has no problem launching, or supporting an Israeli attack, it has forced the IRGC-QF to switch back to the asymmetric warfare model, developed and perfected by Major General Qasem Soleimani prior to his death in a US drone strike.
Continuing Regular Operations: while the IRGC-QF is experiencing financial constraints, it is significantly less affected than other Iranian institutions. This is due to the Supreme Leaderโs need for a strong IRGC-QF to maintain his control over the state itself.
IRGC will continue to remain extremely active across the globe as it works to develop more suppliers, technology, capital, and other items required by the Iranian economy. The IRGC works with everyone and is everywhere as it moves materials via covert smuggling networks.
Iranโs problem started with the death of Soleimani, as he was charismatic, visionary, and most importantly, well connected with the senior leadership in Iran. Major General Mohammad Pakpour, nor his predecessor Major General Ahmad Vahidi, were none of these. The current reality is Iran has less money coming to the Quds Force, who is the smuggling arm of the IRGC, and serves not role on the battlefield. Pakpour doesnโt have the charisma nor connections to get more money.
Focusing on the Middle East: due to the lack of revenue, Iran has been forced to focus more on neighbors and what can be done in the Middle East region. Iranโs priorities are currently geared toward the state of the economy, the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict, the US administration, and the upcoming Iranian presidential elections.
Tracking IRGC-QF activity is very difficult: with the Trump administration taking power in the US, operations have become more covert than usual, making it difficult for international organizations to connect and track IRGC activities.
How has this affected IRGC-QF behavior and operations?
While most analysts agree the IRGC-QF has not discernably modified its behavior, it has modified their thinking โ learning to do more with fewer resources converting it into a more powerful and lethal terror financier. Iranโs overall structure and operational objectives have shifted, forcing enhancement of the existing operational centers to operate more effectively.
Iran has leveraged the greater sanction pain with greater Iranian nuclear capacity. This is because domestically in Iran, escalation, or sustained foreign pressure, is treated as something that must be responded as to not invite more pressure.
This exact line of thinking driving the hardline debate in parliament for an overt response to the killings of senior military officials, especially those involved in the nuclear program.
As a result, the IRGC has:
Increased ties to Venezuela: the only significant change in IRGC behavior has been the increasing ties with Venezuela, which started in 2019 with the appointment of Hojatollah Soltani as the Ambassador. Soltani is a known quantity in Latin America for blending Iranโs foreign ministry with IRGC-QF activities. Iran has become noticeably active in supporting the Maduro regime, the oil and gas sector, and begun taking payments from Venezuela in gold.
More powerful, more aggressive, more creative: as the IRGC-QF now works with limited resources, experts have noted the leadership creatively continuing their covert activities, while adding support for non-security foreign activities. With the shift, the IRGC can await opportunities to strike against US interests abroad. This shift also takes into account IRGCโs role in solving problems the regime has developed due to foreign influence within domestic affairs from conducting assassinations, kidnapping and bombings, and expanding their domestic security role.
Retribution: Iran and the IRGC-QF are still seeking retribution for the killings of Soleimani and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a key nuclear scientist in the nuclear program. As a result, the IRGC has engaged with more radical elements โ even if they are not Shiโa โ and increased support for lone wolf activity, if it can deliver damage to the US.
Support Networks: maximum pressure from the US has forced Iran to look for support wherever it can be found, meaning Iran is looking for support from nations who also oppose US influence.
If we were to provide a list of AORs:
Venezuela
Sub-Saharan Africa โ Nigeria and Senegal, which have Shiโa communities
Canada โ where IRGC and Ministry of Intelligence (MOI) personnel live and operate freely
Southern Caucasus โ Armenia and Azerbaijan
Central Asian Republics โ Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
The bottom line โ Iran will always reach out to groups that are either sympathetic to Iranโs worldview โ within the Shiโa expatriate communities โ or those who oppose US influence.
In Iranโs worldview, its first priority is to connection with those who have an anti-status quo worldview, which is why Iran supports al Qaeda and its presence in Venezuela.
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The IRGC-QF moving forward
While activities are unlikely to change in the near term, it does not rule out continued efforts to attack US interests abroad in ways intended to avoid escalating tensions to armed conflict. To achieve this, the IRGC focuses on two tactics:
Information warfare: information warfare provides dividends for cheap. Iranโs information warfare has become more aggressive and more effective to support their regime and damage adversaries.
Iranโs information operations now leverage cyber tools to disseminate information. Iranโs activity, unlike its adversaries, is not expensive and is something they can deploy with plausible deniability. Additionally, Iran has incorporated partnerships with international cyber hacking organizations, in addition to using their own hackers, to test and penetrate enemy technology networks to steal data and deploy malware that can be accessed when needed.
Surprise: Predicting Iranian behavior is always difficult because of their covert and calculated decision-making process. While the Khobar Towers bombing, the drone attack against Israel in February 2018, and the attack on Saudi Aramco, these events were unlikely to be carried out by rogue elements, yet the rationale behind the attacks are difficult to quantify from Iranโs strategic position.
In Part III, we will start to delve into Iranโs relationship with numerous countries in Latin America, both directly and through Hezbollah. Iranโs relationship with Latin American countries is beneficial commercially, militarily, politically and financially, especially Venezuela. The next 3 parts of this series will be more extensive than the first 2 parts, due to the level of detail involved in Iranโs foreign operations.
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Best Regards,
Khalid Muhammad, Founder
Command Eleven