Since the splinter faction of al Qaeda emerged from the chaos in Iraq in 2003, the Islamic State (ISIS) and its affiliated groups are characterized as the rival of AQ. Until 2019, this assessment was supported by multiple intelligence source, including first hand evidence from senior AQ members, including internal AQ letters. In 2019, due to the ongoing Doha peace negotiation between the US and the Taliban, and the significant territorial loss of the ISIS, this status quo had been changed.
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The IS Pakistan Province (ISP), IS Khorasan Province (ISKP) and AQ alliance
To understand how these two rival groups formed an alliance in 2019, we must see how the ISP/ISKP were established and shaped and by who. There is another factor, as well, that we must consider; there hasn’t been, and there is no, jihadist group operating in the world that hasn’t had ties with AQ as well.
Interlinks
In Pakistan, ISIS first gained support among some groups of disgruntled Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commanders, including some of them who were involved sending fighters to Iraq and Syria under the banner of AQ in 2014. US counterterrorism officials have described the TTP as a “close ally” and “indistinguishable” from AQ. Besides the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, AQ provides ideological guidance and military and financial support for the TTP as well.
Fighters joined ISP/ISKP from Lashkar-e-Janghvi (LeJ) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) groups, mostly veterans who returned from fighting in Syria and Iraq, fighters from Jaysh ul Islam (JuI), the Afghan Taliban, and the HQN (HQN). All these groups have well documented historical ties to AQ, including intermarriages.
The current Emir of the ISKP is Shahab al-Muhajir previously belonged to the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin group, established by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who has historical ties to the Pakistani ISI. Muhajir fought against US allied forces and later joined Taliban factions affiliated with HQN. Notwithstanding, HQN had a generally hostile stance against ISKP, there were occasions when local tactical coordination or coexistence arrangements occur between ISKP affiliates and Haqqani-linked Taliban factions before 2019. This was often out of local necessity to avoid excessive conflict and to focus on mutual enemies.
Briefly, founders who established and joined the ISP/ISKP were/are also commanders in groups which has had close connections with AQ. Also, we must add the fact that fluctuation of fighters within these militant groups is high. However, once established personal, tribal affiliations and connections always exist and it ensures sort of an invisible connection between groups.
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Ideological and/or Doctrinal Differences
“The primary doctrinal distinction between AQ and the ISIS, as discerned by Pakistani jihadists, centres on the ISIS’s pronounced emphasis on Sunni supremacism; even among those who share such supremacist tendencies, allegiances remained flexible. The rivalry between AQ and the ISIS ultimately served the interests of both the Pakistani jihadist milieu and the Pakistani security establishment, as neither faction was invested in a definitive triumph for either global jihadist entity.” - Giustozzi, Antonio. Jihadism in Pakistan: AQ, ISIS and the Local Militants (p. 61). Kindle Edition.
Rivals Without Clashes
There were no significant armed clashes between AQ and ISKP in Pakistan reported between 2014 and 2021. While both groups operated in overlapping regions and sometimes recruited from similar militant pools, their relationship in Pakistan was primarily characterized by rivalry for recruits, ideological criticism, and competing propaganda. The Al Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) response to the challenge mounted by ISKP in 2014-19 was to try avoiding a clash among jihadi groups which shows kind of a neutral position among militant groups.
2019
After the form of ISP/ISKP, the group hasn’t been broadly successful in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has carried out several deadly attacks, but it failed to establish sustained territorial control and political success. This success was attributed to Pakistani and Afghan security forces and to rival groups, like the TTP or the Afghan Taliban/HQN.
The ISIS’s territorial caliphate was eradicated and lost its stronghold in Iraq in 2017 and in Syria in 2019. In 2019, ISIS Core reportedly started to allocate considerable funds to ISP and IS Hind Province (ISHP), but also the priority was reorganizing ISKP as a still forthcoming opportunity in Afghanistan during the Doha negotiations.
In 2019, ISKP obtained new funding and reportedly started negotiations with groups close to AQ, including the HQN and at the same time numerous HQN members joined ISKP. Also, it’s important to highlight the fact that in 2019, 20% of the non-core AQIS members were provided by the HQN.
2020
In 2020, AQIS started the negotiations for some form of a coordination with the ISP. The approach was encouraged by some donors from UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, but donors from Qatar opposed the approach. This information shows that how Gulf donors have the power via money to shape local and regional dynamics. As Antonio Giustozzi wrote in his publication, AQ was ready to team up with ISKP in order to create a safe haven for AQ in case if the Taliban/HQN didn’t provide a permission of safe return for the organization to Afghanistan. However, this information is arguable.
AQ has a long standing historical, ideological and operational connection and family ties with the Taliban and the HQN, and already got the permission of safe return given by Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Emir of the Taliban (representing the Kandahari faction) in spring 2019. Source - UNSC report S/2020/415
Since the HQN has indissoluble ties with AQ and their support for AQ’s return to Afghanistan is explicit, asking permission from the Emir of the Taliban, who belongs to the Kandahari faction was necessary. The permission was granted.
As many AQ members stated earlier, the Taliban are not trustable partners were based on a doubt, AQ was not 100% sure about that the Taliban are taking the risk again to harbour AQ and allow it to run internal and external operations as well. This doubt was eliminated when Sayf al-Adel guaranteed that members of the organization are going to keep a low profile in Afghanistan, obey its Emir and follow any rules that the two Taliban factions set up. This included no media activity, at least those who could be traced back to Afghanistan. Also in return, AQ offered its support for the Taliban/HQN in maintaining security and repressing resistance groups.
The possible alliance with ISIS was very beneficial to AQ and the Taliban/HQN for the obvious reason – preserve the appearance of the “changed Taliban” who cut all ties with AQ.
Until 2019, many senior AQ members were under the protection of HQN in Pakistan. For the Taliban to distance themselves illusively as part of their strategy, during the negotiations and before the safe return, they transferred the close protection of senior AQ members to the ISP and ISKP and to tribes loyal to the HQN. ISP/ISKP and tribes served as an intermediary without AQ having direct and visible ties to the HQN. In this case, the Pakistani intelligence (ISI) could have reported that the Taliban/HQN has no or less significant ties with AQ. This information was also confirmed by multiple sources.
2021
In 2021, several senior AQ members were under the protection of ISP/ISKP and tribes loyal to the HQN. The negotiation seemed successful because the end of the summer 2020, the two organizations decided to establish a safe haven in Nuristan province and AQIS decided to move its headquarters there.
In return, AQIS agreed to support ISKP financially and provided a significant amount of money to the annual budget of ISP/ISKP. The Taliban/HQN, in return, guaranteed a safe space for the ISIS to train and operate from Afghanistan after they seize power. This also guaranteed the survival of the ISIS and its affiliated groups and provided an opportunity for expansion.
Multiple sources confirmed that during the gaining ground of the Taliban in 2020-21 and the fall of Kabul, ISKP fighters fought shoulder to shoulder with the Taliban/HQN and AQ fighters.
After the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, a rift started to appear between the two factions. In the beginning, it was difficult to see with which faction the ISKP was going to side with.
ISKP and the Taliban/HQN in Afghanistan
After the Taliban takeover, many attacks “happened” in Afghanistan, and they were claimed by ISKP. The targets can be divided into two groups, Taliban/HQN members and the Shia community. ISKP targeting the Shia community in Afghanistan is not threat to the Taliban since Shias already have been a target of ongoing discrimination, forced displacement and repression by Taliban supremacy. When we check the affiliation of targeted Taliban members, we clearly can see that how ISKP is used as a proxy and often as a scapegoat by the HQN. Related to the attacks in Afghanistan, also worth mentioning that in 2024, ISKP released a message in Pashtu language stating that not all of the attacks attributed to them are carried out actually by the group.
2023 - The ISIS in Afghanistan
According to intelligence sources on the ground, Gulmorod Khalimov, the ISIS minister of war, despite the official reports that he is dead, is alive. He appeared in the Taliban prison in Nimruz province in the late 2022 and was transported to the North of Afghanistan in spring 2023. He is under the protection of the Taliban GDI. He established several small training centres in the North for foreign ISIS fighters and recruits arriving from Central Asian countries. His main tasks were to destabilize Central Asian countries by trained ISIS fighters, but also to train fighters to carry out attacks in Europe.
At least two sources reported that Gulmorod Khalimov was training close combat and urban fight to foreign fighters in Faizabad. Establishing ISIS training centres in the North of Afghanistan shows how the Taliban/HQN plays a brilliant game, based on plausible deniability. They could always point out that those training centres were established by anti-Taliban forces who joined forces against the regime. Later in 2024, these training centres were dislocated to the Pakistani tribal areas. The Taliban agreed to handover their old training centres and provide military training and equipment.
There are several goals of hosting ISIS and its affiliated groups. It has been years that the Taliban/HQN regime blackmail neighbouring countries, forcing them to remove the Taliban from their terrorist lists and supporting the recognition of the Taliban as a legitimate government in exchange of keeping Islamist fighters under control in Afghanistan and “preventing” them to carry out attacks in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan.
ISKP – ISIS in Afghanistan Goes Global
ISKP began conducting attacks outside the traditional Khorasan region primarily starting in April 2022. ISKP launched rocket attacks from northern Afghanistan across the border into Uzbekistan and in the following month it conducted a similar rocket attack targeting Tajikistan.
High-profile attacks beyond Khorasan:
January 2024 - twin suicide bombing exploded themselves at a mourning procession in Kerman, Iran, and killed about 94 people and wounded many more. According to multiple sources both suicide bombers were trained in Taliban/AQ/ISKP military base in Faizabad, Badakhshan province.
March 2024 - attack on a concert hall in Krasnogorsk near Moscow, Russia, killed 145 people.
Other operations in Dagestan (Russia) in mid-2024 and foiled plots in the United States and Europe with ISKP links
Before 2022, ISKP’s activity was largely concentrated in eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Their transnational external operations beyond the Afghanistan-Pakistan regional sphere intensified significantly starting in 2022.
In summary, in 2022, ISKP moved beyond the Khorasan region deeper into Central Asia, Iran, Russia, and the West in 2023–2024.
The Taliban’s ISKP Counterterrorism Narrative (2018–2020)
During the Doha process, the Taliban leveraged their domestic campaign against ISKP to enhance their legitimacy as a responsible security actor, securing recognition, and manipulating regional diplomacy (notably with Russia and China). This tactical and strategic posture was calibrated to extract concessions from international stakeholders while consolidating internal control.
Despite public engagement and targeted CT measures, persistent reporting suggests that Taliban/Haqqani counter-ISKP campaigns may function as controlled conflict, or “managed theatre,” with overt coordination meetings between Taliban, Haqqani, AQ, ISKP, and ISP leaders being periodically documented by credible sources.
Intelligence and Analytical Implications
Current and historic trends indicate a fluid, adaptive alliance landscape—core and splinter factions pursue operational expediency over doctrinal purity, exploiting shifting political and military conditions. Intelligence monitoring is complicated by institutional pressures for politicized threat assessments, underinvestment in HUMINT, and high crossover between group membership cohorts.
The parallels between alliances seen in Khorasan, Libya, and Somalia (i.e., joint operations between AQ and ISIS elements) reinforce the principle that jihadist entities will subordinate ideological divisions to confront mutual adversaries as strategic imperatives dictate.
List of Taliban targets by ISKP
Best Regards,
JD, Dead Drop Intel
Sources:
Giustozzi, Antonio. Jihadism in Pakistan: AQ, Islamic State and the Local Militants. Kindle Edition.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/s-2020-415.php